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ABSTRACT
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is one of extensively used techniques in a network topology to safe-
guard the integrity and availability of sensitive assets in the protected systems. Although many su-
pervised and unsupervised learning approaches from the field of machine learning have been used to
increase the efficacy of IDSs, it is still a problem for existing intrusion detection algorithms to achieve
good performance. First, lots of redundant and irrelevant data in high-dimensional datasets interfere
with the classification process of an IDS. Second, an individual classifier may not perform well in
the detection of each type of attacks. Third, many models are built for stale datasets, making them
less adaptable for novel attacks. Thus, we propose a new intrusion detection framework in this paper,
and this framework is based on the feature selection and ensemble learning techniques. In the first
step, a heuristic algorithm called CFS-BA is proposed for dimensionality reduction, which selects the
optimal subset based on the correlation between features. Then, we introduce an ensemble approach
that combines C4.5, Random Forest (RF), and Forest by Penalizing Attributes (Forest PA) algorithms.
Finally, voting technique is used to combine the probability distributions of the base learners for attack
recognition. The experimental results, using NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets, reveal
that the proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble method is able to exhibit better performance than other related
and state of the art approaches under several metrics.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the applications of the Internet help society
in many areas such as electronic communication, teaching,
commerce, and entertainment, it has become a part of daily
life of the people. However, cyber security has become vul-
nerable due to the massive expansion of the computer net-
works and rapid emergence of the intrusion incidents. The
necessity of developing cyber security has attracted consid-
erable attention from industry and academia around theworld.
Despite the use of different security applications, such as
firewalls, malware prevention, data encryption, and user au-
thentication, many organizations and enterprises fall victims
to contemporary cyber-attacks [4]. In order to sneak into the
system, attackers might deliberately exploit the vulnerabili-
ties of the target system and launch different types of attacks,
which may lead to the leakage of private information.
As technology is rolling out, these attacks threaten the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of cyber systems
all the time. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs) [26, 89, 90, 91] to protect sys-
tems from a variety of attacks. To be more specific, IDSs are
widely deployed in various distributed systems, perceiving
the malicious intrusions and then taking rapid countermea-
sures to prevent further infections and spread. In general,
IDSs can be classified into two major categories based on
detection mechanisms: anomaly and misuse detection [42].
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In detail, anomaly detection is designed to detect malicious
actions through identifying deviations from a normal pro-
file behavior. Such IDSs perform better at detecting novel
types of attacks, however, they could not avoid a high false
positive (FP) rate [68]. On the other hand, based on known
patterns, misuse detection can effectively distinguish legiti-
mate instances from the malicious ones [46]. Although this
kind of IDSs is reliable for detecting known attacks, it cannot
identify unknown attacks or variations of known ones.
Unfortunately, as the attackers become more sophisti-
cated, new threats and vulnerabilities emerge rapidly. On
the one hand, the risk for critical infrastructures to be com-
promised significantly increases in short order. On the other
hand, in order to detect and deal with novel attacks, a higher
requirement for IDS has also been brought forward. Hence,
many approaches have been researched and developed to im-
prove the detection rate and performance of IDSs. One of
them is Machine learning (ML) [23, 24, 61], which can be
applied for both anomaly and misuse detection models. By
analyzing network traffic passing through central network
nodes, an IDS not only needs to distinguish between benign
and malicious traffic, but also infers the specific class of an
attack occurring in the protected system.
However, in most instances, only a fraction of the traffic
may indicate malicious behaviors while a network is flooded
with normal traffic flows, which leads to the difficulty of
identifying attacks with high Attack Detection Rate (ADR)
while keeping the False Alarm Rate (FAR) low. There was
one problem with the initial idea of applying ML in IDS,
that is, a single classifier may not be strong enough to build
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Building an intrusion detection system
a good IDS. Thus, researchers have come up with the idea of
constructing ensemble classifiers for IDSs [28, 77]. In gen-
eral, the main goal of ensemble learning is to combine a set
of individual classifiers and then make a better classification
decision about the object submitted at the input [72]. For
instance, training a single classifier on different subsets of
an IDS dataset could produce different classification perfor-
mances, however, an ensemble would average the output of
multiple classifiers and therefore become a better option.
Moreover, the numerous attack types and network traffic
attributes pose another challenge for ML as they expand the
search space of the problem and lead to high computational
and time complexity [6]. Notably, feature selection has been
proven to be a good solution for an IDS, which detects highly
relevant features and eliminates useless ones with a mini-
mum degradation of performance [36, 44]. There are three
main models that deal with feature selection: wrapper, fil-
ter, and embedded approaches. Information gain ratio based
feature selection is one of classical filter algorithms, where
information gain ratio represents a ratio of information gain
to the intrinsic information. Although it solves the drawback
of information gain and reduces a bias towards multi-valued
attributes, however, it may be biased towards features with
fewer values in some instances. Different from information
gain ratio, correlation-based feature selection maximizes the
relevance between the input features and the output and min-
imizes the redundancy of the selected features. This algo-
rithm selects one feature at a time according to its strong
correlation with outputs, which can be used to perform both
attribute selection and tuple reduction flexibly.
In this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection sys-
tem to detect various types of attacks with high accuracy and
efficiency. First, as a regular means of dimensionality reduc-
tion and redundancy elimination, a nature-inspired feature
selection algorithm is proposed to retrieve a subset of the
original features. Second, the imbalance between normal
and malicious traffic has a negative effect on the accuracy
of attack detection. To overcome this problem, our solution
then utilizes ensemble classifier to reduce the bias among
different training datasets. In this way, feature selection and
ensemble classifier are combined to improve the stability and
accuracy of the IDS with low computational and time com-
plexity. Finally, an unbiased model can be generated to de-
tect both popular and rare intrusive events. The major con-
tributions of our work are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel methodology that combines the
benefits of feature selection and ensemble classifier
with the aim of providing efficient and accurate intru-
sion detection.
• In the context of feature selection, we provide CFS-
BA based approach, which is used to assess the corre-
lation of the selected features and beneficial for opti-
mizing the efficiency of the training and testing phase.
• To increase the multi-class classification performance
on unbalanced datasets, we introduce an ensemble ap-
proach by combining decisions from multiple classi-
fiers (C4.5, RF, and Forest PA) into one by utilizing
a vote classifier based on the average of probabilities
(AOP) combination rule.
• The proposal is compared with exsitingmethods on an
extensive testbed comprising of three datasets, namely:
NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017. Experimen-
tal results show that the proposed solution surpasses
equivalent methods in terms of Accuracy (Acc), F-
Measure, and ADR classification metrics, while keep-
ing FAR at acceptable levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review the background information concerning
IDSs. Then, the proposedmethodology is given in Section 3,
while in Section 4 we provide the evaluation results through
experiments and comparative analysis. Finally, the conclu-
sion is presented in Section 5.
2. Related work
As a significant tool in computer based systems for en-
suring cyber security, IDS constantly attracts the research
community’s attention. Although plenty of solutions have
been proposed to improve the performance of IDS, in the
context of this section, we only consider related work that
falls under theMLbased IDS, utilizes feature selection or en-
semble classifier, and especially focuses on hybrid approaches.
2.1. On feature selection techniques
For purpose of reducing computational complexity, the
technique of feature selection [59, 60], that can be used as
a pre-processing step in ML algorithms, aims to eliminate
irrelevant features while preserving or even enhancing the
performance of the IDS. In order to obtain more robust and
effective classifier, Hota and Shrivas [36] proposed a model
that used different feature selection techniques to remove ir-
relevant features. The results indicate that C4.5 with infor-
mation gain can achieve the highest accuracy with only 17
features for the NSL-KDD dataset. In addition, Khammassi
and Krichen [44] have applied as a search strategy and lo-
gistic regression as a learning algorithm for network IDSs
to choose the best subset. The results demonstrate that their
method provides high detection rate with only 18 features
for the KDDCup’99 and 20 features for the UNSW-NB15
dataset. Abdullah et al. [1] also proposed a framework of
IDS with selection of features within the NSL-KDD dataset
that are based on dividing the input dataset into different sub-
sets, and combining them using Information Gain (IG) filter.
2.2. On ensemble classifiers
Moreover, ensemble methods are machine learning tech-
niques that combine several base models in order to reduce
false positive rates and produce more accurate solutions than
a single model would. Gaikwad and Thool [33] proposed a
bagging ensemble method using REPTree as its base classi-
fier, which takes less time to build the model and provides
Yuyang Zhou et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 2 of 21
Building an intrusion detection system
highest classification accuracy with lowest false positives on
the NSL-KDD dataset. Jabbar et al. [41] proposed a cluster-
based ensemble classifier for IDS, which is built with Alter-
nating Decision Tree (ADTree) and k-Nearest Neighbor al-
gorithm (kNN). The experimental results show that the pro-
posed ensemble classifier outperforms other existing tech-
niques in terms of accuracy and detection rate. In order to
create a stronger learner, Paulauskas and Auskalnis [70] pro-
posed an ensemble model of four different base classifiers:
J48, C5.0, Naive Bayes, and Partial Decision List (PART),
which depends on the idea of combining multiple weaker
learners. Results prove that their ensemble model produces
more accurate results for an IDS. In order to mitigate mali-
cious events, in particular botnet attacks in Internet of Things
(IoT) networks, Moustafa et al. [62] proposed new statistical
flow features and developed an AdaBoost ensemble learning
method to detect attacks effectively.
2.3. On hybrid approaches
Recently, many hybrid approaches using both feature se-
lection and ensemblemethod have been produced to improve
the performance of IDSs. Malik et al. [57] proposed a com-
bination approach of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)
and Random Forest (RF). More appropriate features for each
class help the proposed model produce a higher accuracy
along with low false positive rate compared with other al-
gorithms. Pham et al. [72] built a hybrid model, which uti-
lizes gain ratio technique as feature selection and bagging
to combine tree-based base classifiers. Experimental results
show that the best performance was produced by the bag-
ging model that used J48 as the base classifier and worked
on 35-feature subset of the NSL-KDD dataset. Abdullah
et al. [1] also built an IDS using IG based feature selec-
tion and ensemble learning algorithms. The experiment on
NSL-KDD dataset indicates that the highest accuracy ob-
tained when using RF and PART as base classifiers under
the product probability rule. In addition, Salo et al. [77]
proposed a hybrid IDS which combines the feature selec-
tion approaches of IG and Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) with an ensemble classifier based on Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Instance-Based learning algorithms (IBK),
and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). A comparative analysis
performed on several IDS datasets has proven that IG-PCA-
Ensemble method exhibits better performance than the ma-
jority of existing approaches. Due to large-scale data pro-
duced from amassive network infrastructure, Khan et al. [45]
proposed a scalable and hybrid IDS, which is based on Spark
ML andConvolutional-LSTM (Conv-LSTM) network to em-
ploy the anomaly and misuse detection separately. Zhong et
al. [99] also proposed a new anomaly detection model called
HELAD, which is based on the Damped Incremental Statis-
tics algorithm for feature selection and organic integration of
multiple deep learning techniques for classification. In [82],
a novel IDS based on hybrid feature selection and two-level
classifier ensembles has been proposed, and experimental re-
sults show that it produces a significant improvement of the
detection rate on the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets.
3. Proposed methodology
In order to increase the detection ability of IDS and pre-
vent the service providers from attack, we propose an effi-
cient ML-based IDS using a metaheuristic optimization al-
gorithm based feature selection approach, and a vote clas-
sifier which is an ensemble of classifiers method. The AOP
combination rule is integrated into themodel for the decision
step. During the experiments, 10-fold cross-validation (CV)
approach is used to validate the performance of the model
and classify benign traffic and various types of attacks.
Fig. 1 demonstrates the detection framework of the pro-
posed ML-based IDS, which consists of the following four
main phases:
• Datasets preprocessing: The first phase is to transform
raw data into a format suitable for analysis by applying
preprocessing to the original datasets.
• Dimensionality reduction: In order to overcome the
problem of high-dimensional datasets, the feature se-
lection approach based on CFS-BA is used to reduce
the dimensionality of the datesets and select the most
relevant features for each type of attacks.
• Classifiers training: For purpose of improving the ac-
curacy of the IDS, we train three individual classifiers
as base learners using C4.5, RF, and Forest PA, and
build an ensemble classifier based on them.
• Attack recognition: The detection model is tested us-
ing a 10-fold cross-validation approach, and voting
technique is used to combine the probability distribu-
tions of the base learners with the AOP combination
rule to make classification decisions.
Finally, according to the results of the ensemble classi-
fier, benign traffic and various intrusive events can be de-
tected and classified with high classification accuracy. De-
tailed information about the framework is provided in Sec-
tions 3.1−3.2.
3.1. Feature selection
The aim of feature selection is to find a subset of the at-
tributes from the original set which are representative enough
for the data, and the attributions in the subset are highly rel-
evant to the prediction. Feature selection approaches can be
mainly categorized into wrapper, filter, and embedded ap-
proaches [35]. While filter approaches assess the relevance
of the features from the dataset and the selection of the fea-
tures is based on the statistics, the classification performance
is used in wrapper approaches as a part of the feature subsets
evaluation and selection processes. In contrast to wrapper
approaches, embedded approaches are computationally less
intensive because they incorporate an interaction between
feature selection and learning process. Although embedded
approaches integrate a regularised risk function to optimize
the features designating parameters and the predictor param-
eters [14], it is not easy to make a modification in the classi-
fication model to get higher performance [56].
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Figure 1: The framework of the proposed Feature selection-Ensemble model.
Modern intrusion detection datasets inevitably contain
plenty of redundant and irrelevant attributes [2], which lower
the efficacy of data mining algorithms and cause uninter-
pretable results [21]. Therefore, the first step in this study
is to reduce the dimensionality and select the feature sub-
set of the utilized dataset [77]. In this paper, a hybrid ap-
proach by combining CFS with BA is proposed to optimize
the efficiency of the feature selection process and enhance
the accuracy of the classification. The main concept of this
approach is to evaluate the relevance and the redundancy of
the selected feature subset which is searched in the given
search space for the optimal solution.
3.1.1. Correlation-based feature selection (CFS)
CFS [80] is one of classical filter algorithms that choose
features according to the result of the heuristic (correlation-
based) assessment function. The preference of this function
is to select subsets whose features are extraordinarily related
with the class but uncorrelated with each other. While in-
significant features that show low association with the class
ought to be ignored on the grounds, repetitive features are
chosen due to high relation with at least one of the rest of
features. The acknowledgment of a feature will rely upon
the degree to which it predicts classes in territories of the in-
stance space not as of now anticipated by different features.
The feature subset assessment function [81] in CFS is as:
푀푠 =
푘푟푐푓√
푘 + 푘(푘 − 1) + 푟푓푓
(1)
In Eq. 1,푀푠 is the heuristic evaluation for a feature sub-set 푠 including 푘 features, 푟푐푓 is the mean correlation degreebetween features and the category label, and 푟푓푓 is the aver-age inter-correlation degree among features. The evaluation
of CFS is amethod of correlation based on feature subsets. A
bigger 푟푐푓 or smaller 푟푓푓 in acquired subsets by the methodproduce a higher evaluation value, and the set of features
with the highest value found during the process is utilised to
reduce the size of both the training and testing set.
3.1.2. Bat algorithm (BA)
The original bat algorithm was developed by Xin-She
Yang in 2010 [94, 95]. Themain inspirations for these works
were the echolocation behavior of microbats. As BA uses
frequency tuning, it is, in fact, the first algorithm of its kind
in the context of optimization and computational intelligence.
Each bat flies randomly with a velocity 푣푡푖, a location 푥푡푖, anda frequency 푓푖 at iteration 푡, in a 푑−dimensional search orsolution space. The location can be considered as a solu-
tion vector to a problem of interest. Among the 푛 bats in the
population, the current best solution 푥∗ found so far can bearchived during the iterative search process.
Defined by Yang [96], the updating rules for location 푥푡푖and velocity 푣푡푖 at time step 푡 are given by
푓푖 = 푓푚푖푛 + (푓푚푎푥 − 푓푚푖푛)훽 (2)
푣푡푖 = 푣
푡−1
푖 + (푥
푡−1
푖 − 푥∗)푓푖 (3)
푥푡푖 = 푥
푡−1
푖 + 푣
푡
푖 (4)
where 훽 ∈ [0,1] is a random vector drawn from a uniform
distribution.
For the local search part, once a solution is selected among
the current best solutions, a new solution for each bat is gen-
erated locally using random walk
푥푛푒푤 = 푥표푙푑 + 휀퐴푡 (5)
where 휀 is a random vector drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion in [-1,1] or a Gaussian distribution, while 퐴푡 is the av-
erage loudness of all the bats at this time step.
In addition, the loudness퐴푡푖 and the rate 푟푡푖 of pulse emis-sion have to be updated accordingly as the iterations proceed.
The updating rules for them can be written as
퐴푡+1푖 = 훼퐴
푡
푖 (6)
푟푡+1푖 = 푟
0
푖 (1 − 푒
−훾푡) (7)
where 0 < 훼 < 1 and 훾 > 0 are constants.
Yuyang Zhou et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 4 of 21
Building an intrusion detection system
3.1.3. CFS-BA approach for feature selection
In this section, we proposed CFS-BA based feature se-
lection approach, which is used to assess the importance and
the correlation of the selected feature subset. CFS-BA ap-
proach utilises correlation based feature technique to form
the fitness functions and evaluation of integrity of the re-
duced feature subset.
For a feature subset 푆 with 푘 features, 푆 = (푠1, 푠2, ...푠푘),CFS assesses the mean feature-class correlation and aver-
age inter-correlation among features by using Eq. 1. As one
of classical filter algorithms, CFS can easily select the sub-
set of independently good features according to the result of
correlation-based evaluation function. However, this feature
subset may not be the best combination because of redun-
dancy between features.
In order to remove the redundant features and reduce the
dimensionality, BA, which inspired by the echolocation be-
havior of microbats, is introduced. In BA, every solution of
the problem is denoted by the location of a bat, which can be
represented by a vector. Bats fly in the search space to search
for the best solutions and during this movement, the current
best solution found so far can be archived. The population
scans for the ideal arrangement by refreshing and updating
the position of every bat based on Eq. 2−Eq. 4 during the
iterative search process.
The feature selection process of the CFS-BA approach
is presented in Algorithm 1. The main parts of the CFS-BA
algorithm can be summarized as follows:
∙ Initialization (lines 1-4). The parameters of algorithm,
generation and evaluation of the initial population are initial-
ized here.
∙ New solution generation (lines 7-8). Here, bats in the
population are moved in the search space according to up-
dating rules of Eq. 2−Eq. 4.
∙ Local search process (lines 9-11). We select a solu-
tion among the best solutions, then generate a local solution
around the selected one by random walks.
∙ Evaluation of the new solution (line 13). The feature
subset assessment function in CFS is utilized here to evaluate
the new solution.
∙Archive of the new solution (line 14-17). The new solu-
tion which meets our requirement needs to be archived here.
After that, the loudness 퐴푡푖 and the rate 푟푡푖 of pulse emissionhave to be updated using Eq. 6−Eq. 7.
∙ Update of the best solution (line 19-20). We compare
the evaluation result of the archived solution and find the
current best 푋푏푒푠푡 until the iterations end.
3.2. Ensemble classification
For ensemble learning, the classification methods usu-
ally combine multiple base classifiers in some way to pro-
duce better accuracy [28]. These classifiers are powerful
to solve the same problem and collectively achieve a fore-
casting result with higher stability and accuracy by creating
multiple independent models and combining them [53]. The
classical reasons for employing ensemble classifiers to im-
prove the effectiveness are representational issue, statistical
Algorithm 1 CFS-BA approach for feature selection
Input: Training Dataset and Testing Dataset
Output: Selected Feature Subset 푋푏푒푠푡
1: Initialize a population of 푛 bats 푋푖 = (푥푖1, ...푥푖퐷)푇 (푖 =
1, 2, ..., 푛) and 푣푖
2: Initialize frequency 푓푖, pulse emission rate 푟푡푖, and loud-ness 퐴푡푖
3: Initialize 푓푖푡(푋푖) (cf. Eq.1) and 푋푏푒푠푡
4: Initialize 푓푖푡푡푒푚푝(푖) and 푋푡푒푚푝(푖) for solution storage
5: while 1 ⩽ 푡 ⩽Max no. of iterations do
6: for 푖 = 1 to 푛 do
7: Generate new 푓푖 (cf. Eq.2)
8: Update 푋푖 and 푣푖 (cf. Eq.3 and Eq.4)
9: if 푟푡푖 < rand(0,1) then
10: Select a 푋푖 from 푋푏푒푠푡
11: Generate a new 푋푛푒푤 (cf. Eq.5)
12: end if
13: Calculate 푓푖푡(푋푛푒푤) (cf. Eq.1)
14: if 푓푖푡(푋푖) ⩽ 푓푖푡(푋푛푒푤) and N(0,1) < 퐴푡푖 then
15: 푓푖푡푡푒푚푝(푖) ← 푓푖푡(푋푛푒푤)
16: 푋푡푒푚푝(푖) ← 푋푛푒푤
17: Decrease 퐴푡푖 and Increase 푟푡푖 (cf. Eq.6 and Eq.7)
18: end if
19: if 푓푖푡(푋푛푒푤) ≥Max of 푓푖푡푡푒푚푝 then
20: 푋푏푒푠푡 ← 푋푛푒푤
21: end if
22: end for
23: 푡 = 푡 + 1
24: end while
reason, and computational reason. First, sometimes a single
classifier is not qualified to obtain the best representation in
the hypothesis space, therefore, it is necessary to combine in-
dependent classifiers to improve the predictive performance.
Second, if the input dataset is not sufficient to train the learn-
ing algorithm, the result may lead to a weak or false hypothe-
sis. In the last case, in order to produce a suitable hypothesis,
an individual classifier could spend a significant amount of
computing time, in which the procedure will be more likely
to cause problems.
Bagging [15] and Boosting [29] are the two most popu-
lar algorithms in ensemble learning, usually producing good
results in classification and being widely chosen to build
many ensemble models. Moreover, the other well-known
ensemble learning methods for improving the performance
of classification are Voting [38] , Bayesian parameter aver-
aging [32], and Stacking [40]. Likewise, ensemble methods
have been shown to improve accuracy in many use cases, in-
cluding intrusion detection. For example, the results in [1,
72, 77] proved that their proposed ensemble models produce
better performance of IDS than the one using a single classi-
fier. For security professionals, ensemble classifiers provide
mechanisms that aid in analysis such as similarity to existing
known malicious or benign samples.
Among decision tree algorithms, C4.5 has been widely
used in the field of anomaly detection due to its high effi-
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ciency and its simple characteristics. Meanwhile, random
forest is the most representative algorithm among ensem-
ble learning methods, and it is generally more robust and
can achieve better performances than single decision trees.
Moreover, Forest PA can use the strength of the entire feature
space to generate trees with high accuracy. With its novel
weight assignment strategy and bootstrap sampling, Forest
PA generates highly diverse trees while retaining their higher
individual accuracy. Therefore, C4.5, random forest, and
Forest PA are selected to construct the ensemble for multi-
class intrusion detection in this paper.
For bagging algorithm, the base classifiers are generated
in parallel by bootstrap sampling. Boosting works by train-
ing a set of classifiers sequentially and combining them for
prediction, where the later classifiers focus more on the mis-
takes of the earlier classifiers. However, sensitivity to noise
leads to performance degradation when appearing wrong la-
bels. Moreover, base classifiers usually are homogeneous in
bagging and boosting, which will be not suitable for three
different base classifiers (C4.5, random forest, and Forest
PA) in this paper. Although stacking generates an ensem-
ble of heterogeneous learners, it will bring enormous com-
putational complexity when generating different level mod-
els. Compared to the above algorithms, in this paper, voting
is more suitable for heterogeneous learners ensemble with
lower computational complexity and less time overhead.
3.2.1. C4.5
C4.5 [73] is a typical decision tree algorithm which is
developed based on the ID3 [37] algorithm. This algorithm
passes through decision tree, visits each node and select op-
timal split based on themaximisation of the gain ratio, which
is represented by the following formula:
퐺푎푖푛푅푎푡푖표(퐴) = 퐺푎푖푛(퐴)
푆푝푙푖푡퐼푛푓표(퐴)
(8)
In the process, an attribute with the highest information
gain is chosen as splitting attribute for the node 푁 . Infor-
mation gain represents how much uncertainty in the set 퐷
is reduced after it is partitioned on attribute 퐴, where the
uncertainty can be calculated by entropy as:
퐸푛푡푟표푝푦(퐷) = −
∑
푥∈푋
푝(푥)푙표푔2푝(푥) (9)
where푋 is the set of classes in퐷 and 푝(푥) is the proportion
of number of elements in class 푥 to the number of elements
in set 퐷.
Likewise, 푆푝푙푖푡퐼푛푓표 is the term which describes how
equally the attribute splits the data and can be calculated as:
푆푝푙푖푡퐼푛푓표(퐴) = −
푛∑
푗=1
|퐷푗||퐷| 푙표푔2
(|퐷푗||퐷|
)
(10)
where |퐷푗 ||퐷| represents the weight of the 푗−th partition in theset 퐷.
Moreover, as an improvement of ID3 algorithm, C4.5
has the capability to model or classify both discrete and con-
tinuous attributes, and can ignore missing attribute values in
a dataset.
3.2.2. Random Forest (RF)
Random Forest, proposed by Breimanis in [16], is an-
other decision tree technique that operates by constructing
multiple decision trees. It takes thousands of input variables
without variable deletion and classifies them based on their
significance. RF can be described as an ensemble of classi-
fication trees where every tree contributes with a single vote
for the task of the most frequent class to the input data. Com-
pared to other machine learning methods (e.g., support vec-
tor machine, artificial neural network), there are fewer pa-
rameters to be specified when running RF. In RF, a collec-
tion of individual tree structured classifiers can be defined
as: {
ℎ
(
푥, 휃푘
)
, 푘 = 1, 2, ...푖...
} (11)
where ℎ represents RF classifier, {휃푘} stands for randomvectors distributed independently identical, and each tree has
a vote for the most famous class at input variable 푥. The
nature and dimensionality of 휃 depends on its use in tree
construction.
The key to the success of RF is the creation of each deci-
sion tree that makes up the forest. A bootstrapped subset of
the training dataset is created to train each tree in the forest.
Due to this fact, on average, each tree makes use of around
two-thirds of the training dataset. The unused elements are
called by the Out Of Bag (OOB) samples, which are used for
inner cross-validation to evaluate the classification accuracy
of RF.
Significantly, RF has a low computational burden, and it
is insensitive to the parameters and outliers. Besides, over-
fitting is less of an issue compared to individual decision
tree, and there is no need to prune the trees which is a cum-
bersome task [27].
3.2.3. Forest by Penalizing Attributes (Forest PA)
Unlike some existing algorithms that use a subset of the
non-class attributes, Forest PA [3] is an algorithm that builds
a set of highly accurate decision trees by exploiting the strength
of all non-class attributes available in a data set. At the same
time, some weight-related concerns, such as weight assign-
ment strategy and weight increment strategy, are taken into
account in order to retain individually accurate and promote
strong diversity.
For the weights of the attributes that appear in the latest
tree, Forest PA will randomly update the weights for those
attributes within a Weight-Range (WR), which can be de-
fined as follows:
푊푅휆 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
[0.0000, 푒−
1
휆 ], 휆 = 1
[푒−
1
휆−1 + 휌, 푒−
1
휆 ], 휆 > 1
(12)
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where 휆 represents the level of the attribute and 휌 is used to
ensure the WR for different levels be non-overlapping. For
example, if an attribute appears in the root node then its 휆 =
1. In the same way, if an attribute is tested at a child node of
the root node then its 휆 = 2.
Moreover, in order to address the negative effect of re-
taining weights which are not present in the latest tree, Forest
PA has a mechanism to gradually increase weights of the at-
tributes that have not been tested in the subsequent trees. Let
an attribute 퐴푖 is tested at Level 휌 of the 푇푗−1−th tree with
휂 height and its weight is 휔푖. Then, the weight incrementvalue 휎푖 of 퐴푖 is calculated as:
휎푖 =
1.0 − 휔푖
(휂 + 1) − 휆
(13)
3.2.4. Vote
Vote is a meta algorithm which performs the decision
process by applying several classifiers [18]. It uses the power
of several individual classifiers and applies a combination
rule for the decision. For example, minimum probability,
maximum probability, majority voting, product of probabil-
ities, and average of probabilities are different algorithms for
combination rules. In order to deal with the multi-class clas-
sification, majority voting could not be chosen because the
number of classes is more than that of base classifiers. In
this paper, average of probabilities approach is used to make
decision, where the class label is determined based on the
maximum value of the average of predicted probabilities.
Suppose we have 푙 classifiers 퐶 = {퐶1, ..., 퐶푙}, and 푐
classes Ω = {휔1, ..., 휔푐}. For instance, due to the abovebase classifiers considered in our experiment, 푙 can be set to
3, and the value of 푐 depends on the number of attack types.
A classifier 퐶푖 ∶ 푅푛 → [0, 1]푐 accepts an object 푥 ∈ 푅푛 and
outputs a vector
[
푃푐푖 (휔1|푥), ...푃푐푖 (휔푐|푥)], where 푃푐푖 (휔푗|푥)
denotes the probability assigned by the classifier 퐶푖 that ob-ject 푥 belongs to class 휔푗 . For each class 휔푗 , let 푚푗 repre-sents the mean of the probabilities assigned by the 푙 classi-
fiers, which can be calculated as:
푚푗 =
1
푙
푙∑
푖=1
푃푐푖 (휔푗|푥) (14)
let푀 = [푚1, ...푚푐] be the set of mean probabilities for
푐 classes. Then, 푥 is assigned to the class 휔푘 if 푚푘 is themaximum in푀 .
4. Evaluations and results
As stated before, this paper aims to develop an efficient
intrusion detection system with high accuracy and low false
alarms. For this purpose, a hybrid method, combined CFS
and BA named CFS-BA, is performed to determine a sub-
set of the original features in order to eliminate the irrele-
vant features, and improve the classification efficiency. In
the classification step, an ensemble classifier combined three
different algorithms, C4.5, RF, and Forest PA based on the
AOP combination rule, is trained and tested based on three
datasets. The experiments are performed byWeka 3.8.3 [92]
on desktop PC with 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7-4790 processor
and 16GB RAM.
4.1. Description of the benchmark datasets
During the evaluation of IDS, one of the challenges faced
by researchers is finding a suitable dataset. Acquiring a real
world dataset that represents the traffic flowing through the
network without any sort of anonymization or modification
is a problem that has been continuously encountered by the
cybersecurity research community [5]. Even in the cases
where the data is allowed to be released or shared for public
use, it will be heavily anonymized or severely altered. This
will cause a lot of the essential data components that are con-
sidered critical to the researchers to be lost or no longer re-
liable.
For this reason, many researchers have decided to use
simulated datasets such as themost well-knownKDDCup’99
dataset [75], or one of its contemporaries the NSL-KDD
dataset [85]. Recently there has been a significant effort to
try and develop data sets that are reflective of real world data.
In 2015, Kolias et al. [48] published Aegean WiFi Intrusion
Dataset (AWID) dataset, which includes real traces of both
normal and intrusive 802.11 traffic. In addition, in 2017, the
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC) published an in-
trusion detection dataset named CIC-IDS2017 [78], which
resembles the true real-world data packet capture (PCAPs).
Therefore, in this paper, experiments are conducted based on
the NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets.
4.1.1. NSL-KDD dataset
The NSL-KDD dataset [85] was proposed in 2009 as a
new revised version of the original dataset KDDCup’99 [51].
On the one hand, NSL-KDD retained the advantageous and
challenging characteristics of KDDCup’99. On the other
hand, it addressed some drawbacks inherited from the orig-
inal dataset by eliminating redundant records, rationalizing
the number of instances, and maintaining the diversity of se-
lected samples. It is worth noting that the NSL-KDD dataset
is compiled to maximize the difficulty of prediction, which
constitutes its outstanding characteristics. In order to group
the records into five difficulty levels, the initial dataset was
evaluated using several benchmark classifiers, and each in-
stance was annotated with the number of its successful pre-
dictions [12]. For each difficult level group, the amount of
selected records is inversely proportional to the record per-
centages from the original KDDCup’99 dataset.
In this study, KDDTrain+, KDDTest+, and KDDTest-
21 sets of the NSL-KDD dataset are used. The KDDTrain+
set contains total 125,973 instances comprising of 58,630 in-
stances of attack traffic and 67,343 instances of normal traf-
fic. Whereas, the KDDTest+ set contains total 22,544 in-
stances, and as a subset of the KDDTest+ set, the KDDTest-
21 set includes total 11,850 instances. Cross-validation is
done on the the KDDTrain+ set in our experiments, and to
extend this benchmark, we also consider a validation test
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using simple hold-out (train-test) approach applied on KD-
DTest+ and KDDTest-21 sets. A detailed overview of the
instances is shown in Table 1.
4.1.2. Aegean WiFi Intrusion Dataset (AWID) dataset
AWID was publicly available in 2015 as a collection of
sets of WiFi network data, which contain real traces of both
normal and intrusive data collected from real network envi-
ronments [48]. Each record in the dataset is represented as
a vector of 155 attributes, and each attribute has numeric or
nominal values. Based on the number of target classes, the
dataset can be classified into AWID-CLS dataset andAWID-
ATK dataset. AWID-CLS dataset groups the instances into 4
main classes including normal, flooding, impersonation, and
injection, while AWID-ATK dataset has 17 target classes
that belong to the 4 main classes. On the other hand, based
on the number of instances, all the datasets have two differ-
ent versions: Full Set and Reduced Set. It is important to
mention that these two versions are not related. The reduced
set was collected independently from the full set at different
times, with different tools, and in different environments.
For this research we have conducted experiments on the
the reduced four class dataset (AWID-CLS-R-Tst) by using
cross-validation method for classification purposes. In gen-
eral, AWID-CLS-R-Tst set includes total 575,643 instances,
and more detailed information about the numbers of specific
attacks can be seen in Table 2.
4.1.3. CIC-IDS2017 dataset
The CIC-IDS2017 dataset was published by Canadian
Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC) in 2017, it contains benign
and the most up-to-date common attacks [78]. It also in-
cludes the results of the network traffic analysis using CI-
CFlowMeter with labeled flows based on the time stamp,
source and destination IPs, source and destination ports, pro-
tocols, and attacks (CSV files). This is one of the newest
intrusion detection datasets, which covers necessary crite-
ria with updated attacks such as DDoS, Brute Force, XSS,
SQL Injection, Infiltration, Port Scan, and Botnet. In detail,
this dataset contains 2,830,743 records devised on 8 files and
each record includes 78 different features with its label.
In order to maintain the same order of magnitude of each
dataset while taking into account the requirements of multi-
classification, theWednesday-workingHours set has been cho-
sen for experiments through cross-validation method. This
set includes total 691,406 instances belonging to 6 categories,
and the static information of the set is given in Table 2.
4.2. Dataset preprocessing
Data preprocessing is the most time consuming and es-
sential step in data mining. Realistic data typically comes
from heterogeneous platforms and can be noisy, redundant,
incomplete, and inconsistent [54]. Thus, it is important to
transform raw data into a format suitable for analysis and
knowledge discovery. Therefore, in this research, the pre-
processing step involves data filtration, data transforming as
well as data normalization.
Table 1
Statistics of the three sets of the NSL-KDD dataset.
Class NSL-KDD
KDDTrain+ KDDTest+ KDDTest-21
Normal 67343 9711 2152
DoS 45927 7458 4342
PRB 11656 2421 2402
R2L 995 2754 2754
U2R 52 200 200
Attacks 58630 12833 9698
Total 125973 22544 11850
Table 2
Statistics of the AWID and CIC-IDS2017 datasets.
Class AWID Class CICIDS-2017
CLS-R-Tst Wed.
Normal 530785 Normal 439683
Injection 16682 DoS slowloris 5796
Flooding 8097 DoS Slowhttptest 5499
Impersonation 20079 Dos Hulk 230124
DoS GoldenEye 10293
Heartbleed 11
Attacks 44858 Attacks 251723
Total 575643 Total 691406
4.2.1. Data filtration
Due to the heterogeneity of the platforms, the raw data
inevitably contain anomalous and redundant instances, which
may have a negative influence on classification accuracy. In
order to solve this problem, these records need to be removed
from the dataset at the beginning of our experiments. For
instance, the feature ‘Fwd Header Length’ appears twice in
the CIC-IDS2017 dataset, and ‘Flow Packets/s’ includes ab-
normal values such as ‘Infinity’ and ‘NaN’. Moreover, we
have replaced missing values with zeroes and dropped out
the features with constants values as they do not contribute
to the class distinction. For example, the AWID-CLS-R-Tst
set remains 84 features from the original 155 ones after data
filtration.
4.2.2. Data transforming and normalization
The utilized datasets contain symbolic, continuous, and
binary values. For instance, the feature ‘protocol type’ in the
NSL-KDD datasets includes symbolic values such as: ‘tcp’,
‘udp’, and ‘icmp’. As many classifiers accept only numerical
values, the converting process is considered vital and has a
significant impact on IDS accuracy. In this paper, we replace
every single value with an integer in order to handle the sym-
bolic features. Moreover, different scales among features
can degrade the classification performance, for example, fea-
tures that take on large numeric values, e.g., for the CIC-
IDS2017 dataset, ‘Flow Duration’ can dominate the classi-
fier’s model relative to features with relatively small numeric
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Table 3
Selected features for the NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets.
NSL-KDD AWID CIC-IDS2017
No. Feature Name No. Feature Name No. Feature Name
3 service 1 frame.time_epoch 1 Destination Port
4 flag 15 radiotap.datarate 6 Total Length of Bwd Packets
5 src_bytes 16 radiotap.channel.freq 13 Bwd Packet Length Mean
6 dst_bytes 17 radiotap.channel.type.cck 15 Flow Bytes/s
14 root_shell 24 wlan.fc.frag 17 Flow IAT Mean
26 srv_serror_rate 29 wlan.duration 34 Bwd Header Length
29 same_srv_rate 32 wlan.ta 37 Min Packet Length
30 diff_srv_rate 35 wlan.frag 50 Down/Up Ratio
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 57 Subflow Bwd Bytes
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate 58 Init_Win_bytes_forward
59 Init_Win_bytes_backward
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Figure 2: Normalized confusion matrices based on the NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets.
values such as ‘Total Fwd Packets’. Accordingly, normal-
ization is a ‘scaling down’ transformation which maps fea-
tures onto a normalized range. A simple and fast approach
called minimum-maximum method [49] is used in our ex-
periments, which can be defined as:
푥 =
푥 − 푥푚푖푛
푥푚푎푥 − 푥푚푖푛
(15)
where 푥푚푖푛 and 푥푚푎푥 represent the minimum and maximumvalues of feature 푥.
4.3. Results and discussion
The performance of IDS is evaluated based on its capa-
bility of classifying network traffic into a correct type. In
order to avoid the effect of data sampling when assessing
the IDS, therefore, we conducted experiments by using re-
peated k-fold (kf) cross-validationmethod, and the value of k
is considered as 10. In this paper, all the performance results
reported are the average value of outputs from 10 iterations
of 10f validation approach, and each experiment is repeated
with different seed for avoiding biased results. More specif-
ically, for each dataset, we provide the confusion matrix de-
rived from the testing process of CFS-BA-Ensemble, and
compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with no
feature selection and some state-of-the-art methods in terms
of several detection metrics, including Accuracy (Acc), pre-
cision, Detection Rate (DR), F-Measure, Attack Detection
Rate (ADR), and False Alarm Rate (FAR). The mathemat-
ical calculations of the utilized evaluation metrics are ex-
plained in [25].
First, essential features are identified by utilizing the pro-
posed CFS-BA approach to evaluate the integrity of the re-
duced feature subset in the feature selection stage. Then,
candidate features are selected from the original ones for
the next stage. Table 3 shows the numbers and names of
selected features for NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017
datasets. By implementing CFS-BA alone, the approach is
seen to reduce the dimensionality drastically and eliminate
the irrelevant features of the dataset. Finally, in order to sig-
nificantly improve the predictive performance of IDS, an en-
semble classifier which consists of three different decision
tree classifiers is used in a vote algorithm.
Fig. 2(a), Fig. 2(b), and Fig. 2(c) separately indicate the
multi-class classification performance of the proposed IDS
with 10f cross-validation among the NSL-KDD, AWID, and
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Table 4
Performance classification for feature selection based on NSL-KDD with 10f validation.
(a).The performance results based on the original features (41 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.941 0.945 0.941 0.943 0.913 0.035 16.91
RF 0.949 0.944 0.949 0.947 0.903 0.021 14.98
ForestPA 0.945 0.942 0.945 0.944 0.913 0.028 43.16
Ensemble 0.953 0.951 0.953 0.952 0.919 0.016 51.44
(b).The performance results based on the selected features using CFS-BA (10 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.986 0.012 2.93
RF 0.991 0.988 0.991 0.989 0.987 0.009 8.63
ForestPA 0.987 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.985 0.008 29.66
Ensemble 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.001 36.28
CIC-IDS2017 datasets. It is observed that the performance
of most classifications is adequate, while several attacks can
not be classified very well, such as ‘U2R’ and ‘Heartbleed’.
As seen in Table 1 and Table 2, the numbers of these in-
stances are much less than others, which significantly affects
the classification results of these attacks. In detail, there are
only 11 instances with the label ‘Heartbleed’ out of 251,723
attack instances in the CIC-IDS2017 and 52 ‘U2R’ instances
in the KDDTrain+ set, which poses a challenge for the IDS
to correctly classify them. In general, the proposed method
is not focused on a specific class, it is proposed for selecting
relevant features for all classes, which could not guarantee
the performance of every type of attacks, especially some
attacks with very few instances in the datasets. However, as
the classification results for normal instances are pretty well
among these datasets, the developed system can be used for
intrusion detection.
4.3.1. Comparison with no feature selection
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS,
we make a comparison between the proposed feature selec-
tion approach and without feature selection to distinguish at-
tacks from benign instances. Thanks to the selection of rel-
evant features by the proposed CFS-BA algorithm, the av-
erage values of these metrics, such as Acc, precision, DR,
F-Measure, and ADR, have increased significantly.
Table 4 summarizes the performance based on the NSL-
KDD dataset, which includes the results of the base and en-
semble classifiers. It is indicated that the ensemble classi-
fier is not good enough in some metrics without implement-
ing feature selection. By contrast, the proposed CFS-BA-
Ensemble method performs best on all the three sets. In de-
tail, our model exhibits the highest accuracy of 0.998, F-
Measure of 0.998, ADR of 0.997 and the lowest FAR of
0.001 based on the NSL-KDD dataset. As seen in Table 5,
the proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble approach still achieves the
best performance results inmost respects on theAWIDdataset,
such as the highest accuracy of 0.995, the highest ADR of
0.959, and the lowest FAR of 0.002. Each base classifier us-
ing the selected feature exhibits higher accuracy and ADR
than the ensemble classifier with the original features, which
strongly proves the effectiveness of the proposed feature se-
lection method. Similarly, the result of the comparison on
the CIC-IDS2017 dataset is shown in Table 6, we observe
that the performance of the proposed feature selection ap-
proach outperforms that of all features in every respect, and
the CFS-BA-Ensemble approach achieves the highest accu-
racy rate of 0.999, DR of 0.999, and ADR of 0.999 with only
13 features, which also outperforms all other individual clas-
sifiers. In contrast, the best accuracy values of the C4.5, RF,
and ForestPA classifiers are 0.983, 0.993, 0.988 using CFS-
BA based feature selection method, respectively.
Furthermore, due to the dimensionality reduction of the
subsets, the proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble model reduces the
time overhead when it is applied to the feature selection and
ensemble model. Table 4-Table 6 also show a comparison of
the average model building time (MBT) consumed by single
training based on the different numbers of features. For the
NSL-KDD dataset, although it does not take much time to
build the ensemble model on this set, the reduction still takes
almost 30% of the original MBTwhen applying CFS-BA for
feature selection. Due to the huge amount of data with high
dimensionality, the ensemble method with the original fea-
tures takes approximately 500s and 1000s for the AWID and
CIC-IDS2017 datasets separately. Thanks to the feature se-
lection method, the ensemble model with CFS-BA has mit-
igated the MBT considerably compared with that using all
original features, all the MBTs of CFS-BA-Ensemble model
on these three datasets have been restricted within 100s. Es-
pecially for the CIC-IDS2017 dataset, there is a significant
reduction on the MBT of the ensemble classifier when using
the CFS-BA based feature selection method, from 977.94s
to 98.42s.
4.3.2. Comparison with other feature selection
methods
As explained in Section 4.1, the benchmark datasets re-
flect a contemporary and complex threat environment. The
increased number of attack classes and its highly imbalanced
records pose a significant challenge to every machine learn-
ing approach. In order to further evaluate our proposed IDS
model, we compare it with some well-known feature selec-
tion methods, namely IG (Information Gain) [11], IGR (In-
formation Gain Ratio) [58], GA (Genetic Algorithm) [65],
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Table 5
Performance classification for feature selection based on AWID with 10f validation.
(a).The performance results based on the original features (84 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.954 0.953 0.999 0.976 0.789 0.034 94.93
RF 0.979 0.982 0.996 0.989 0.783 0.004 142.84
ForestPA 0.966 0.982 0.981 0.981 0.784 0.019 435.11
Ensemble 0.982 0.982 0.999 0.990 0.784 0.002 488.46
(b).The performance results based on the selected features using CFS-BA (8 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.913 0.010 9.96
RF 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.945 0.004 26.51
ForestPA 0.990 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.902 0.003 79.93
Ensemble 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.956 0.001 92.62
Table 6
Performance classification for feature selection based on CIC-IDS2017 with 10f validation.
(a).The performance results based on the original features (78 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.960 0.961 0.984 0.973 0.918 0.016 212.59
RF 0.968 0.985 0.981 0.983 0.946 0.019 244.85
ForestPA 0.967 0.978 0.984 0.981 0.938 0.016 859.62
Ensemble 0.977 0.991 0.988 0.990 0.956 0.012 977.94
(b).The performance results based on the selected features using CFS-BA (13 features)
Classifier Acc Precision DR F-Measure ADR FAR MBT(s)
C4.5 0.983 0.996 0.989 0.992 0.974 0.011 32.02
RF 0.993 0.995 0.998 0.996 0.984 0.003 58.04
ForestPA 0.988 0.993 0.988 0.991 0.978 0.006 80.82
Ensemble 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.001 98.42
PSO (Particle SwarmOptimization) [98], andMBAFS (Mod-
ified Bat Algorithm for Feature Selection) [93] by conduct-
ing experiments based on these three datasets. Likewise, in
this comparative study we use the common metrics in the
context of Acc, F-Measure, ADR, and FAR. Especially, to
figure out the efficiency of the proposed IDS, the compari-
son has also been done in terms of number of selected fea-
tures and its selection time. Fig. 3 summarizes the average
performance of our model as compared to the other feature
selection methods based on the same proposed voting based
ensemble classifier.
First, as shown in Fig. 3(a), the accuracy of our pro-
posed model outperforms that of other algorithms based fea-
ture selection in every dataset, and the proposed CFS-BA-
Ensemble approach achieves the highest average accuracy
rate of 99.81%, 99.52%, and 99.89% over the NSL-KDD,
AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets, respectively. Similarly,
Fig. 3(b) indicates that our proposed model exhibits better F-
Measure than other feature selection methods on all datasets
through extracting more relevant feature subsets, which in-
crease the value of F-Measure from 0.969 to 0.998, 0.961 to
0.995, and 0.957 to 0.999 over these three datasets. Next, the
attack detection rate, which stands for the accuracy rate for
the attack classes, is an important indicator to evaluate the
performance of an IDS. According to Fig. 3(c), it can be ob-
served that the attack detection rate of our proposed model
ranges from 95.64% to 99.92%, which significantly exceeds
other feature selection methods based on any one of the five
sets. Moreover, as Fig. 3(d) illustrates, our proposed CFS-
BA based model achieves the lowest FAR values of 0.08%,
0.15%, and 0.12% based on the NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-
IDS2017 datasets separately. In comparison with other fea-
ture selection methods, our proposed model has mitigated
FAR considerably on each dataset and guaranteed the effec-
tiveness of an IDS.
Notably, Fig. 3(e) and Fig. 3(f) exhibit the number of se-
lected features using different algorithms and its selection
time, which can indicate the efficiency of an IDS. When
compared to IG and IGR, although the proposed method
takes a little more time than them, CFS-BA selects less fea-
tures, and as seen in Fig. 3(a), the accuracy of the proposed
IDS is much higher than that of IG and IGR. For GA and
PSO based feature selection methods, each of them obtains
less features than CFS-BA on the AWID dataset, however,
they need more feature selection time on all the five sets
and could not achieve better detection accuracy. MBAFS,
a modified bat algorithm for feature selection, is considered
to be most similar to our feature selection method. Accord-
ing to Fig. 3(a)−3(d), MBAFS performs better than any of
other methods in terms of these performance metrics except
the proposed CFS-BA, and its performance is only slightly
worse than our method. Since MBAFS introduces random
bats and mutation mechanism, the search space is expanded
in every iteration and the subset may be generated in any
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Figure 3: Comparison performance with other feature selection methods based on the three datasets.
uncertain direction. Therefore, as Fig. 3(e) illustrates, the
subset selected by MBAFS contains one more feature than
CFS-BA on any of these five sets, which may affect the per-
formance of the IDS if the additional feature are not highly
correlated. In addition, as the number of iterations before
convergence increases, the feature selection time taken by
MBAFS is more than ours, which can be seen in Fig. 3(f). In
general, CFS-BA is superior to other feature selection meth-
ods in terms of performance and efficiency.
4.3.3. Comparison with other classifiers
Similarly, to evaluate the performance of our proposed
ensemble classifier, experiments have been conducted using
different classification algorithms among five preprocessed
sets with CFS-BA feature selection. First, the proposed vot-
ing based ensemble classifier with AOP combination rule
is chosen, and we construct a stacking classifier with C4.5,
RF, and Forest PA as base classifiers, and Logistic Regres-
sion (LR) [47] as meta classifier to make a comparison with
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Figure 4: Comparison performance of per classifier across three datasets with 10f cross-validation.
our voting classifier. Second, we select some widely stud-
ied ensemble algorithms, such as AdaBoost (AB) [39] and
Gradient Boosted Machine (GBM) [30] to make a compar-
ison. Third, some single classifiers like k-Nearest Neighbor
(kNN) [55], Classification andRegression Trees (CART) [17],
andMulti-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [52] have been chosen as
well.
However, an algorithm may not be able to achieve good
results over all datasets, which makes quite difficult to com-
pare different algorithms over multiple datasets. In order to
perform the comparison of classifiers in a correct way [88],
it is necessary to statistically analyze the significance of the
classifiers’ performance. Thus, the significance tests has been
considered essential to find whether the classifiers are signif-
icantly different from each other or not [22]. In order to give
a thoroughly comparative study, two statistical significance
tests, Friedman test [31] and Nemenyi post-hoc test [63],
are adopted. In our case, the null-hypothesis is that there is
no performance difference among different classifiers, and
it can be rejected if at least one classifier is found signifi-
cantly different from at least one other classifier. Since there
are 7 classifiers to be compared in this case, Friedman test
is chosen to prove whether at least one classifier performs
Table 7
Average ranks for 10f cross-validation across three datasets.
Accuracy F-Measure ADR FAR
Voting 1.667 1.967 1.467 1.867
Stacking 3.133 2.933 3.600 2.733
AdaBoost 3.867 5.033 3.733 3.333
GBM 2.067 2.367 3.400 4.000
kNN 5.467 5.233 5.533 5.533
CART 4.867 4.633 3.467 4.533
MLP 6.933 5.867 6.800 6.000
significantly better than another one over all datasets [84].
If the Friedman test reports a significant difference, to de-
tect between which classifiers those differences appear, the
Nemenyi post-hoc test will be then proceeded for pairwise
multiple comparisons.
For the Friedman test, it ranks the algorithms for each
dataset separately. For example, for a given dataset, the al-
gorithm performing best gets the rank of 1, the second best
gets rank 2, and so on. After that, Friedman test will do it
again over another dataset until we obtain all rankings on all
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Figure 5: Critical difference of all classifiers in term of accuracy metric.
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Figure 6: Critical difference of all classifiers in term of attack detection rate metric.
datasets. Let 푟푖푗 be the rank of the 푗-th algorithm on the 푖-thdataset, where 푖 = 1, 2, ..., 푛, and 푗 = 1, 2, ..., 푘. Then, the
average rank of 푗-th algorithm can be calculated as Eq. 16,
and the Friedman statistic (F-Statistic) can be computed as
Eq. 18, where 휒2퐹 is calculated as Eq. 17.
푅푗 =
1
푛
푛∑
푖=1
푟푖푗 (16)
휒2퐹 =
12푛
푘(푘 + 1)
[ 푘∑
푗=1
푅2푗 −
푘(푘 + 1)2
4
]
(17)
퐹−푆푡푎푠푡푖푐 =
(푛 − 1)휒2퐹
푛(푘 − 1) − 휒2퐹
(18)
퐶퐷 = 푞훼
√
푘(푘 + 1)
6푛
(19)
If the null-hypothesis is accepted, F-Statistic will be dis-
tributed according to the F-distribution for a given 훼 with
푘−1 and (푘−1)(푛−1) degrees of freedom. In this study, the
values of 푘 and 푛 are set as 7 and 3, and two values of 훼
(0.05 and 0.1) are considered. Otherwise, if we reject the
null-hypothesis, then the Nemenyi post-hoc test will be per-
formed to compare all classifiers with each other. The per-
formance of two classifiers is significantly different when the
difference between their average ranks is greater or equal to
the critical difference (CD), where CD can be calculated as
Eq. 19. In Eq. 19, 푘 and 푛 still represent the numbers of
classifiers and datasets, and 푞훼 is the critical value. Due to 7classifiers are used for comparison, according to Table 5 (a)
in [22], 푞0.05 = 2.949 and 푞0.1 = 2.693 in our case.First, we analyze the average value of all mentioned met-
rics achieved with 10f cross-validation on the three datasets,
which is shown in Fig. 4. It is observed from Fig. 4(a) that
Table 8
Friedman test statistics for 10f cross-validation.
Accuracy F-Measure ADR FAR
F-Statistic 6.5665 2.0810 3.3242 1.7904
p value 0.0029 0.1319 0.0363 0.1839
훼 = 0.05 R A R A
훼 = 0.1 R A R A
Voting, GBM, and Stacking outperform other classifiers in
terms of accuracy (99.81%, 99.55%, and 99.91%) over NSL-
KDD,AWID, andCIC-IDS2017 datasets separately butMLP
achieves lowest accuracy values across all datasets. Simi-
larly, Voting, GBM, and Stacking perform best in terms of
F-Measure according to Fig. 4(b). However, kNN,MLP, and
AdaBoost perform worst with F-Measure of 0.9935, 0.9882,
and 0.9928. In terms of ADR metric, our proposed Voting
based ensemble classifier performs best by achieving 99.7%
and 99.92% on the NSL-KDD and CIC-IDS2017 datasets,
and CART achieves the highest ADR value (95.74%) on the
AWID dataset, whereas MLP is the worst performer over the
three datasets. Fig. 4(d) indicates the average FAR values
of all classifiers over all three datasets. Voting, CART, and
Stacking separately exhibit the lowest FAR values of 0.084,
0.143, and 0.075 for NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017
datasets. However, CART achieves theworst performance in
terms of FAR for the NSL-KDD and CIC-IDS2017 datasets,
and the worst performing classifier is GBM for the AWID
dataset.
Then, the performance results are statistically assessed
using Friedman and Nemenyi post-hoc test. According to
experimental results, the average ranks of all the classifiers
for 10f cross-validation are shown in Table 7. Thus, the F-
Statistic and 푝 value for each performance metric is com-
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Table 9
Comparison of different combination rules under the NSL-KDD dataset based on accuracy.
Average of probabilities Majority voting Product of probabilities Minimum probability Maximum probability
Normal 99.90 99.75 98.67 98.67 98.71
DoS 99.92 99.63 99.48 99.48 99.32
PRB 99.48 98.53 97.32 97.32 98.69
R2L 94.57 93.38 90.55 90.15 89.61
U2R 55.77 57.69 53.85 53.85 51.92
Table 10
Comparison of different combination rules under the AWID dataset based on accuracy.
Average of probabilities Majority voting Product of probabilities Minimum probability Maximum probability
Normal 99.85 99.75 98.67 98.67 98.71
Injection 99.98 99.90 98.91 98.91 99.15
Flooding 92.71 90.16 88.92 89.29 86.45
Impersonation 93.21 91.89 89.45 89.45 93.63
puted, and Table 8 shows Friedman test statistics for 10f
cross-validation results. From the results it is observed that
푝 values under accuracy and ADR are less than 0.05, there-
fore the null-hypothesis is rejected and we can conclude that
the performance of the classifiers is significantly different in
terms of accuracy andADRmetrics. In order to detect which
classifier pairs perform significantly different, Nemenyi post-
hoc test is performed, and the results of the pairwise compar-
ison over accuracy and ADR values are presented in Fig. 5
and Fig. 6. It is indicated that for accuracy metric the classi-
fier’s performance is highly significant (shown in Fig. 5(a))
in the case of Voting-MLP and less significant (shown in
Fig. 5(b)) in the case of GBM-MLP, whereas remaining pairs
are not significant. As shown in Fig. 6, the classifier’s ADR
measure is only found highly significant in case of Voting-
MLP pair, while all other pairs are not significant. The ex-
perimental results show that Voting and GBM are suitable
classifiers if the IDS demands high accuracy, and we highly
suggest our Voting based ensemble classifier due to it also
shows outstanding performance in terms of ADR metric.
4.3.4. Comparison with other combination rules
In this section, we explain the experimental results us-
ing CFS-BA-Ensemble approach with different combination
rules we reached during the experiments. Similarly, the av-
erage accuracy values of outputs from 10 iterations of 10f
validation approach are used for evaluation of the models.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, minimum probability, max-
imum probability, majority voting, product of probabilities,
and average of probabilities are common combination rules
when using voting technique to construct an ensemble clas-
sifier. Therefore, in order to evaluate the multi-classification
performance of these aggregation methods, from Table 9 to
Table 11, we compare and analyze the average accuracy val-
ues of each combination rule for each attack type of different
datasets.
Table 9 shows the accuracy values of each rule for the
NSL-KDD dataset. For ‘Normal’, ‘DoS’, ‘PRB’, and ‘R2L’,
the average of probabilities combination rule achieves the
highest performance accuracy values of 99.90%, 99.92%,
99.48%, and 94.57% compared to the other combination rules.
Although the performance of majority voting rule is better
than average of probabilities in ‘U2R’ attack, the improve-
ment in accuracy may lead to only one more attack instance
identified due to the number of ‘U2R’ instances in the NSL-
KDD dataset. Therefore, compared to majority voting, we
prefer to use average of probabilities combination rule for
more accurate classification on most instances of the NSL-
KDD dataset.
According to the results shown in Table 10, the high-
est accuracy values of 99.85%, 99.98%, and 92.71% are ob-
tained for ‘Normal’, ‘Injection’, and ‘Flooding’ with aver-
age of probabilities combination rule based on the AWID
dataset. For the ‘Impersonation’ attack, the performance of
maximum probability rule is slightly better than AOP but,
when we consider most of the cases and the difference be-
tween accuracy values for two cases, we still suggest the
average of probabilities rule for the AWID dataset. Simi-
larly, as shown in Table 11, it is obviously observed that
the best performance is still achieved with the average of
probabilities combination rule for most classes of the CIC-
IDS2017 dataset, such as ‘Benign’, ‘DoS slowloris’, ‘DoS
Hulk’, and ‘DoS GoldenEye’. The majority voting com-
bination rule achieves the highest accuracy of 99.02% for
‘DoS Slowhttptest’, however, it produces the worst accuracy
of 97.77% for ‘DoS Hulk’ and has no advantages for other
types of attacks when compared to the average of probabil-
ities combination rule. According to results in this table, it
can also be indicated that the performance of the maximum
probability combination rule for ‘Heartbleed’ (90.91%) is
better than the other rules. However, as seen in Table 2,
there are only 11 instances of ‘Heartbleed’ contained in the
CIC-IDS2017 dataset. The advantage on the classification
for ‘Heartbleed’ attacks cannot make up for its drawbacks
on the other attacks when in comparison with the average of
Yuyang Zhou et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 15 of 21
Building an intrusion detection system
Table 11
Comparison of different combination rules under CIC-IDS2017 dataset based on accuracy.
Average of probabilities Majority voting Product of probabilities Minimum probability Maximum probability
Benign 99.88 99.73 97.80 97.82 97.34
DoS slowloris 99.26 98.34 97.48 97.48 96.64
DoS Slowhttptest 98.95 99.02 97.29 97.29 96.02
Dos Hulk 99.97 97.77 98.56 97.80 97.77
DoS GoldenEye 99.59 99.10 97.64 97.64 97.15
Heartbleed 81.82 81.82 72.73 72.73 90.91
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Figure 7: Normalized confusion matrices based on the KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21 sets.
probabilities combination rule.
Based on the experimental results on the three datasets,
therefore, in this study, we decided to apply the AOP as com-
bination rule in our proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble model.
4.3.5. Comparison with the state of the art methods
NSL-KDD dataset provides some different test sets, such
as KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21 for benchmarking the ma-
chine learning algorithms. To evaluate the proposed model
on unseen attacks, we have conducted experiments with the
proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble model by using the datasets
KDDTrain+ for training and KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21
for testing. Fig. 7 indicates the multi-class classification per-
formance of the proposed IDS based on the KDDTest+ and
KDDTest-21 test sets. As seen in Fig. 7(a), the proposed
model can achieve the accuracy of 0.97 for normal traffic,
whereas 0.85 and 0.89 for ‘DoS’ and ‘PRB’ attacks based
on the KDDTest+ set. Similarly, it can be observed from
Fig. 7(b) that our method can obtain the accuracy of 0.87,
0.68, and 0.87 for ‘Normal’, ‘DoS’, and ‘PRB’ instances.
Moreover, our proposed method obtains accuracy values of
0.62 and 0.42 for the ‘R2L’ and ‘U2R’ attacks onKDDTest+,
which are similar to that on KDDTest-21. On one hand, the
proposed model has been trained on the KDDTrain+ set,
where the ‘R2L’ and ‘U2R’ instances occupy the smallest
proportion of all instances. On the other hand, the ‘R2L’ and
‘U2R’ instances are the same in theKDDTest+ andKDDTest-
21 set according to Table 1, so the classification performance
for them is almost the same.
To extend the benchmark, we also have compared our
CFS-BA-Ensemble with the performance achieved by previ-
ous studies that use the datasets KDDTest+ and KDDTest-
21 for testing. The comparison results with some of the ex-
isting approaches on these two sets are shown in Table 12.
The highest detection accuracy is achieved by the proposed
approach based on the experimental results on KDDTest+,
which outperforms the other recent IDS techniques, includ-
ing FSSL [9], FSSL-EL [34], and TSE-IDS [82]. Besides
having superior detection accuracy, the proposedmethod also
outperforms significantly other approaches in terms of detec-
tion rate metric. Even though EM-FS [72] performs best in
terms of FARmetric, it only achieves the accuracy of 84.25%
based on 35 features. However, our proposed method can
obtain higher accuracy of 87.37% with FAR of 3.19% based
on only 10 features, which still outperforms EM-FS to some
extent. Moreover, according to the experimental results tested
on the KDDTest-21 set, the proposed approach can achieve
the accuracy of 73.57%, DR of 73.6%, and FAR of 12.92%
with a 10-feature subset, which clearly outperforms other
state of the art classifiers in terms of all the evaluation met-
rics shown in Table 12.
In order to further interpret the advantages of the pro-
posed approach, in this section, some state of the art stud-
ies applied on each dataset are compared with our proposed
CFS-BA-Ensemble method. More precisely, the compari-
son includes the feature selection techniques, the classifica-
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Table 12
Comparison results with other existing methods on KDDTest+ and KDDTest-21.
Method Dataset Feature selection Classification method # Features Acc(%) DR(%) FAR(%)
NBTree [85] KDDTest+ N/A NB Tree 41 82.02 N/A N/A
Fuzzy [50] KDDTest+ N/A Fuzzy classifiers 41 82.74 86.7 3.9
SVM [71] KDDTest+ N/A SVM 41 82.37 82 15
FS+GAR-forest [43] KDDTest+ Symmetrical GAR-forest 32 85.056 85.1 12.2
TDTC [64] KDDTest+ LDA+PCA NB+CF-kNN N/A 84.86 N/A 4.86
FSSL [9] KDDTest+ Clustering FSSL 41 84.12 N/A N/A
EM-FS [72] KDDTest+ IGR Bagging(C4.5) 35 84.25 N/A 2.79
FSSL-EL [34] KDDTest+ PCA Ensemble(CART) 20 84.54 N/A 5.31
TSE-IDS [82] KDDTest+ Hybrid Two-stage Ensemble 37 85.797 86.8 11.7
NBTree [85] KDDTest-21 N/A NB Tree 41 66.16 N/A N/A
FSSL [9] KDDTest-21 Clustering FSSL 41 68.82 N/A N/A
FSSL-EL [34] KDDTest-21 PCA Ensemble(CART) 20 71.29 N/A 20.35
TSE-IDS [82] KDDTest-21 Hybrid Two-stage Ensemble 37 72.52 72.5 18.00
Proposed KDDTest+ CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 10 87.37 87.4 3.19
Proposed KDDTest-21 CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 10 73.57 73.6 12.92
N/A: name not available.
tionmethod, the number of selected features, accuracy, FAR,
and DR for intrusion detection. Furthermore, to compare
more fairly with these existing methods, we ensure that the
datasets used by these methods, even if the specific version
of the datasets, are the same as ours. Similarly, these existing
methods all adopt cross-validation approach. The results of
our proposed method compared to the existing approaches
in each dataset are presented in Tables 13 and 14.
Although the multi-class classification performance of
our proposed method has been proven through experiments,
to provide more reference for the readers, we still compare
the results of our CFS-BA-Ensemble method with other ear-
lier researches in binary classification based on NSL-KDD,
AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets, which is shown in Ta-
ble 13. First of all, it can be seen in Table 13 that our pro-
posed model outperforms other similar ensemble classifiers,
such as FS-EL [83], XGBoost-IDS [13], and TSE-IDS [82]
when using 10f cross-validation as a validation technique.
There are also some deep learning methods for IDS in the
current literature such as DEMISe [69], DeepWindow [79],
and HELAD [99]. Even though HELAD performs very well
in terms of accuracy rate, DR, and FAR, the proposedmethod
can still achieve a better performance compared with these
methods. When compared to these binary classificationmeth-
ods, the proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble method has a slight
advantage on accuracy and DR against all of them applied
on the three datasets. And although some of previous studies
did not provide data for FAR, it achieves extremely low FAR
by 0.08%, 0.15%, and 0.12% across all datasets, which is a
useful property for real-world IDSs. Additionally, the pro-
posedmethodmay not be the best by considering the number
of selected features, however, it is worth selecting only a few
more features to effectively improve the performance of the
classifier.
As shown in the following Table 14, we then compare the
performance of our proposed method, CFS-BA-Ensemble,
with these existing methods for multi-class attack classifi-
cation. For the NSL-KDD dataset, OR+FS [76] exhibits a
high accuracy value of 99.43% based on the selected 6 fea-
tures, however, the proposed approach achieves higher ac-
curacy by 0.38% with 4 more features needed. Similarly,
in contrast to earlier ensemble methods on AWID and CIC-
IDS2017 datasets, like MVWIDS [7], ELWNIDS [87], and
DARE [10], the proposed approach achieves better perfor-
mances in accuracy and DR while limiting FAR at a lower
level.
In general, the proposed method achieves promising re-
sults in the context of accuracy rate, DR, and FAR across
the NSL-KDD, AWID, and CIC-IDS2017 datasets in com-
parison with the earlier studies. However, it should be noted
that Table 13 and 14 just provide a snapshot of comparison
between our proposed model and the state of the art methods
in intrusion detection problem. Thus, there might be some
limitations in this comparison. For example, data processing
method, parameter setting of the algorithm, and many other
experimental factors are all unknown for the existing tech-
niques. Although we have tried to make as fair a comparison
as possible, we cannot claim that our proposed intrusion de-
tection model always performs better when compared to any
of the other methods in the context of intrusion detection.
However, according to the comparison results indicated in
Table 13 and 14, our proposed CFS-BA-Ensemble method
still provides a powerful competitive advantage in the intru-
sion detection domain.
5. Conclusions
Although many machine learning approaches have been
proposed to increase the efficacy of IDSs, it is still a problem
for existing intrusion detection algorithms to achieve good
performance. In this paper, to deal with the high-dimensional
and unbalanced network traffic, we propose a novel intrusion
detection framework, which is based on the feature selection
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Table 13
Comparison results with other state of the art binary classification approaches.
Method Dataset Feature selection Classification method # Features Acc(%) DR(%) FAR(%)
FRCM [66] KDDTrain+ Greedy Stepwise Fuzzy Ownership NN 11 99.6356 99.6145 0.309
FS-EL [83] KDDTrain+ CFS+PSO Boosting(CART) 11 99.7285 99.77 N/A
OneR-BN [67] KDDTrain+ OneR BN+TAN N/A 99.7412 99.7646 0.2792
TSE-IDS [82] KDDTrain+ Hybrid Two-stage Ensemble 37 96.388 N/A N/A
DEMISe [69] AWID-CLS-R Autoencoder,MI RBFC 7 98 99.04 3
SSLA [74] AWID-CLS-R N/A Ladder Network 95 99.28 99.45 0.23
DARE [10] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A One-class SVM 10 66 57 N/A
XGBoost-IDS [13] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A XGBoost 80 91.36 98.38 12
ZED-IDS [19] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A Autoencoder 83 95.73 95.82 4.32
DeepWindow [79] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) MI+MIC LSTM N/A 99.5 99.4 N/A
HELAD [99] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) DIS+DBN Autoencoder+LSTM 50 99.58 99.58 2.15
Proposed KDDTrain+ CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 10 99.81 99.8 0.08
Proposed AWID-CLS-R CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 8 99.52 99.5 0.15
Proposed CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 13 99.89 99.9 0.12
N/A: name not available.
Table 14
Comparison results with other state of the art multi-class classification approaches.
Method Dataset Feature selection Classification method # Features Acc(%) DR(%) FAR(%)
AR-C4.5 [20] KDDTrain+ Attribute Ratio C4.5 22 99.794 N/A N/A
SS-BN [97] KDDTrain+ Sequential Search Bayesian Network 11 98.98 N/A 0.60
OR+FS [76] KDDTrain+ IQR,CFS+BFS kNN 6 99.43 N/A N/A
IG-RT [86] AWID-CLS-R IG Random Tree 41 95.12 92 0.538
MVWIDS [7] AWID-CLS-R N/A Voting(ET,RF,Bagging) 20 96.32 96 N/A
ELWNIDS [87] AWID-CLS-R CFS RF 18 99.096 N/A 0.248
DARE [10] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A RF 10 98 98 N/A
DeepDetect [8] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A ANN 80 98.694 98.694 1.882
XGBoost-IDS [13] CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) N/A XGBoost 80 99.54 99.54 0.15
Proposed KDDTrain+ CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 10 99.81 99.8 0.08
Proposed AWID-CLS-R CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 8 99.52 99.5 0.15
Proposed CIC-IDS2017(Wed.) CFS-BA Voting(C4.5,RF,ForestPA) 13 99.89 99.9 0.12
N/A: name not available.
and ensemble learning techniques. First, we propose a CFS-
BA algorithm with the aim of selecting the optimal subset
based on the correlation between features. Then, the ensem-
ble classifier based on C4.5, RF, and ForestPA with the AOP
rule is introduced to construct the classification model. Fi-
nally, the proposed IDS is evaluated by 10f cross-validation
over three intrusion detection datasets.
The experimental results are promising with an accu-
racy of classification equal to 99.81%, 99.8% DR and 0.08%
FAR with a subset of 10 features for the NSL-KDD dataset,
and the obtained results for the AWID provide accuracy of
99.52% and 0.15% FAR with a subset composed of only 8
features. Remarkably, our model achieves the highest accu-
racy of 99.89% and DR of 99.9% on the subset of 13 features
for the CIC-IDS2017 dataset. Then, the comparison with no
feature selection method demonstrates encouraging perfor-
mance on several metrics, and it should be noted that our pro-
posal sharply reduces the MBT from 977.94s to 98.42s on
the CIC-IDS2017 dataset. Our method also outperforms re-
lated feature selection approaches in terms ofAcc, F-Measure,
ADR, and efficiency while limiting FAR at relatively low
levels. In addition, our solution shows outstanding perfor-
mance in terms of ADRmetric when compared to other clas-
sification algorithms, and the comparison results with the
state of the art methods indicate that the proposed CFS-BA-
Ensemble method can provide a powerful competitive ad-
vantage in the intrusion detection domain. Although the pro-
posed CFS-BAEnsemblemethod has indicated superior per-
formance, in the future work, its capability could be further
improved to deal with rare attacks from the massive network
traffic.
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